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A strong theory has emerged in recent years that the quality of corporate law primarily
determines whether securities markets arise, whether ownership separates from control, and whether
the modern corporation can prosper. The theory has been used convincingly to explain why we see
weak corporate structures in transition and developing nations, but less convincingly to explain why
concentrated ownership persists in continental Europe or why it became less important in the United
States. The theory has its real-world correlates as international agencies focus on corporate
governance for transition and developing economies, while several already-wealthy nations also
focus on improving corporate law.  Surely, when an economically-weak society lacks regularity￿a
gap that may be manifested by weak or poorly enforced corporate law￿that lack of regularity and
that lack of economic strength precludes complex institutions like securities markets and diffusely-
owned public firms.  But in several nations in the wealthy west legal structures are quite good and,
by measurement, shareholders are well protected, but ownership has still not yet separated from
control. Something else has impeded separation. We can hypothesize what that something is by
examining the calculus of owners and investors when they decide whether to diffuse ownership. 
Ownership cannot readily separate from control when managerial agency costs are especially high.
 And missing from current discourse is the basic concept that even American corporate law￿usually
seen as high quality nowadays￿does not burrow into the firm to root out those managerial agency
costs that arise from mediocre business decisions. Judicial doctrine and legal inquiry attack self-
dealing, not bad business judgment.  The business judgment rule, under which judges do not second-
guess managerial mistake, puts the full panoply of agency costs￿such as over-expansion, over-
investment, and reluctance to take on profitable but uncomfortable risks￿beyond direct legal
inquiry.  (This limit from the business judgment rule is not a “defect” in corporate law:  aggressive
judicial attack on managerial error would replicate the costs of government management of business.
Something other than direct legal attack has to control basic managerial agency costs, because
judicial action here is far too costly.)  The consequence is that even if corporate law as usually
conceived is “perfect,” it eliminates self-dealing, not managerial mistake. But managers can lose for
shareholders as much, or more, than they can steal from them, and law directly controls only the
second cost not the first. If the risk of managerial error varies widely from nation-to-nation, or from
firm-to-firm, ownership structure should vary equally widely, even if conventional corporate law
tightly protected shareholders everywhere.  There is also good reason, and some new data, consistent
with this analysis: by measurement several nations have fine enough corporate law; distant
stockholders are protected from controlling stockholder and managerial thievery, but uncontrolled
agency costs though seem to be especially high in those very nations.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Introduction
The critical precondition to developing modern securities markets, and
the economic and technological benefits that go with good stock markets,
most recent analyses posit, is a foundation of solid corporate and securities
laws that protect stockholders from the rampages of the dominant majority
stockholders or controlling managers. Without such corporate law
protections securities markets, it is said, will not arise. And if corporate
law is good enough in technologically advanced nations, ownership will
diffuse away from concentrated ownership into dispersed stock markets.
This perspective contributes to understanding the fragility of capital
markets in transition and third-world economies.  But there is too much
that is critical to separation that corporate law does not reach in the
world’s richest, most advanced nations.  And if those conditions—which
depend on institutions other than corporate law—aren’t met, ownership
will not diffuse.  And in nations that do not meet those conditions, public
policy makers would have little reason to invest much in developing good
corporate law institutions, because they just would not be used.
The conceptual problem is basic:  Current academic thinking lumps
together costly opportunism due to a controller’s self-dealing and costly
managerial decision-making that inflicts losses on the owners.  The first,
self-dealing, corporate law seeks to control directly; the second, bad
decision-making that damages shareholders, it does not.
Other institutions must control the latter and their strength varies from
nation-to-nation.  Owners tend to stay as blockholders if they expect
managerial agency costs would be very high after full separation.
Corporate law does not even try to directly control the costs of
                                                            
* Berg Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks for comments go to
Lucian Bebchuk, Victor Brudney, John Coates, Einer Elhauge, Howell Jackson, Ehud
Kamar, Reinier Kraakman, Mitch Polinsky, and participants in workshops at Harvard
Business School, the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Italian Securities
Commission (CONSOB), the Sorbonne, and the Columbia, Harvard, Stanford,
University of Southern California and Vanderbilt Law Schools.2 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
mismanagement. Other institutions do.  For these other institutions
(product market competition, incentive compensation, takeovers,
shareholder primacy norms, etc.), corporate law is at most a supporting
prop, not the central institution.  And, even if one thinks law has an equal
role to play in both—in motivating managers as well as in deterring insider
machinations—the two depend on different laws and different institutions.
 These would vary in strength, because of differing national histories,
politics, and economic conditions; countries can, and do, better deal with
one than the other, thereby affecting which organization—close or diffuse
ownership—its institutions favor.
Among the world’s richer nations, several by measurement have good
minority stockholder protection, which the quality-of-corporate law theory
would predict should have long ago facilitated separating ownership from
control.  But despite protective results that keep the rampages of the
majority stockholders in check, ownership has not yet neatly separated
from control. Our task is to assess the theoretical implications of why
separation did not happen, since these counter-examples tell us that
deficient corporate law probably was not the basic impediment.
The fact that ownership did not separate from control in a nation does
not tell us whether it didn’t separate because blockholder rampages are
uncontrolled or because managerial agency costs would be far too high
if ownership separated. Each could have prevented separation.  Or one
alone could have, with the other not standing in the way.  If underlying
economic, social, or political conditions make managerial agency costs
very high, and if those costs are best contained by a controlling
shareholder, then concentrated ownership persists whatever the state of
corporate law in checking blockholder mis-deeds.
I speculate on what underlying economic, political, and social
conditions could make managerial agency costs persistently high.  I also
speculate on how a shrinking of these agency costs, one plausibly now
going on in continental Europe, could raise the demand to build legal
institutions that facilitate separation. 
Many business features could keep agency costs higher in one nation
than another: a weak product market is one; especially opaque businesses
is another; an inability to use incentive compensation effectively because
it would, say, disrupt relationships within the firm, is a third; a high level
of social mistrust that impedes professionalization of management is a
fourth.CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 3
Corporate law, when it’s effective, impedes insider machinations: it
stops, or reduces, controlling shareholders from diverting value to
themselves, and bars managers from putting the firm into their own
pockets. When, for example, controllers obtain very high private benefits
from control, because they divert firm value into their own pockets, then
distant shareholders mistrust the insiders, and are unwilling to buy. 
Ownership concentration should, all else equal, persist.  Good corporate
law (or substitutes like stock exchange rules, contract, media glare, or
reputational intermediaries) can, by reducing this potential for thievery,
facilitate separating ownership from control.
But there is more to running a firm than controlling insider
machinations. Managerial agency costs to distant shareholders come in two
basic flavors: thievery and mismanagement.  Law can reduce the first, but
does very little directly to minimize the second.  Not yet fully recognized
in the current literature is that American law avoids dealing with the
second.  The business judgment rule has courts refusing to intervene when
shareholders attack managerial mistake. Indeed, one might argue in only
a modest over-statement that in modern American business history, there
has been only one significant successful judicial attack on managers for
mistake, that in Smith v. Van Gorkom, an attack the legislature promptly
reversed.
It’s business conditions, incentives, professionalism, capital structure,
product and managerial labor market competition, and financial alignment
with shareholders that directly impede managerial mistakes, not corporate
law.  Conventional, technical corporate law has little to say here.  (True,
law can create or destroy anything, so law isn’t irrelevant, but it is a
second-order phenomenon:  other institutions primarily control managerial
mistake, law’s role here, if any, is either to support or drag on those
primary institutional controls.)  Even if one believes law to be central to
competition, compensation, and so on—the institutions that reduce
managerial agency costs—one must recognize that these laws differ from
corporate law that controls insider machinations, and their efficaciousness
could differ:  one nation’s laws might control machinations well but
managerial error poorly.
Today’s corporate theory cannot explain why several wealthy
European nations protect minority shareholders well, but nevertheless still
have concentrated ownership.  The most plausible theory is that ownership
hasn’t separated not because of weak corporate law, but because a)4 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
managerial agency costs from dissipating shareholder value would be very
high after full separation, and b) concentrated ownership reduces those
costs to shareholders enough.  I suggest why these costs to shareholders
vary from nation-to-nation and firm-to-firm.  
Moreover, by shifting our focus from legally malleable private benefits
to managerial agency costs, we can see why sub-standard corporate law
persists in a few richer, well-developed nations.  Low quality law might in
some nations be a symptom of weak separation, not its base-line cause.
 If these kinds of managerial agency costs from dissipating shareholder
value would be too high anyway for there to be much separation even if
corporate law were perfect, then there’s little reason for the players (public
policy-makers, investors, founding and family owners) to build good
corporate law, because it wouldn’t be much used anyway.
*   *   *
A second theoretical limit afflicts the quality-of-corporate-law
argument. High quality corporate law could propel diffusion.  But it can
just as easily propel concentration.  Its effect is indeterminate.  High
quality corporate law makes distant stockholders comfortable with
blockholders, because good law channels blockholders away from stealing
from distant stockholders and into productive activity (such as overcoming
shareholder free rider and informational problems or monitoring managers,
for example).  Channeling blockholders away from anti-stockholder action
should mean in theory that improving the quality of corporate law could,
all else equal, increase blockholding as easily as it could decrease it. 
Minority stockholders have less reason to fear the big blockholders when
corporate law protects them.  If the blockholders increase value, then we
could see more of them develop, not fewer of them, as corporate law
quality improved.
*   *   *
 Good corporate law that stymies a grasping controller, or good
substitutes like effective stock exchanges, effective reputational
intermediaries and the like, is good for a nation to have.  It reduces the
costs of running a large enterprise.  But it is insufficient to induce
ownership separation.  It’s thus at least possible that some reformers may
be pinning their hopes too heavily on good corporate law institutions to
propel development in third world and transition countries.CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 5
My logic here is that the current wisdom and theory tell us that when
the core of corporate law is atrocious, and substitutes unavailable, complex
firms cannot be stabilized. This is true, and the empirical contributions
here are considerable.  But the converse of the current wisdom is believed
as well, although it is false:  Bad law impedes separation, but when there’s
no separation, law could be good with something else impeding that
separation, not corporate law.  Since several nations have protective
corporate law but nevertheless have very little separation, we need some
new theory to explain why.
*   *   *
A roadmap for this Article: I outline in Part I the quality of corporate
law argument and why it is important.  In Part II I show why when
potential dissipatory managerial agency costs are perniciously high in a
society, but containable by dominant stockholders, corporate law quality
is irrelevant or tertiary:  even if it’s good, ownership will not separate from
control.  (I distinguish two types of agency costs:  those that shift value
away from stockholders to controllers and those that dissipate shareholder
value.)  Conventional corporate law can contain managerial agency costs
due to thievery, but does not directly contain managerial agency costs due
to mismanagement.  Concentrated ownership will persist in firms in high-
agency-cost nations even if conventional corporate law quality is high as
long as the owner can contain enough of these costs.  In Part III I show
why the data indicates that the quality of corporate law argument, although
it explains transition economies nicely, is over-stated for several of the
world’s richest nations: in too many of them basic shareholder protections
seem adequate, stock can be and is sold, but ownership nevertheless
doesn’t separate from control. Something else has made concentrated
control persist.  I speculate what that might have been.
Lastly, I conclude. High quality, protective corporate law is a good
institution for a society to have.  It lowers the costs of building strong,
large business enterprises.  It can prevent, or minimize, controlling
stockholder diversions, a necessary condition for separation.  But among
the world’s wealthier nations, it doesn’t primarily determine whether it’s
worthwhile to build those enterprises. It’s a tool, not the foundation.6 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
I.   The Argument: Corporate Law as Propelling Diffuse
Ownership
Today’s most powerful and most widely-accepted academic
explanation for why continental Europe lacks deep and rich securities
markets is the purportedly weak role of corporate and securities law in
protecting minority stockholders, a weakness that is said to contrast with
America’s strong protections of minority stockholders. A major European-
wide research network, leading financial economists, and leading legal
commentators have stated so.
1  One can imagine the Nobel Prize winning
Franco Modigliani shaking his head in disappointment when writing that
nations with deficient legal regimes cannot get good stock markets and,
hence, “the provision of funding shifts from dispersed risk capital [via the
stock market] … to debt, and from [stock and bond] markets to
institutions, i.e., towards intermediated credit.”
2  In a powerful set of
important articles insightful economists showed that deep securities
markets correlate with an index of basic shareholder legal protections.
3 
These protections are important: “[P]rotection of shareholders … by the
legal system is central to understanding the patterns of corporate finance
in difference countries.  Investor protection [is] crucial because, in many
countries, expropriation of minority shareholders … by the controlling
shareholders is extensive.”
4  Leading legal commentators have signed on
to the law-driven theory.
5
At the same time, international agencies such as the IMF and the
World Bank have admirably promoted corporate law reform, especially
that which would protect minority stockholders.
6  The OECD has had
major initiatives to improve corporate governance, both in the developing
                                                            
1. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer (1999); La Porta et al. (1998), at 1136-
37 and (1997), at 1138; Bebchuk (1999); Becht & Röell, (1999); Carlin & Mayer (Oct.
1998), at 33; Coffee (1999).
2. Modigliani & Perotti (1998), at 5; see also Modigliani & Perotti (1997).
3. See La Porta et al. articles, cited supra note 2.
4. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (2000), at 4..
5.  See Coffee (1999).
6. The IMF’s journal, Finance & Development, tells us that “improved corporate
governance [institutions] are essential parts of economic reform programs under way
in many countries.”  Iskander, Meyerman, Gray & Hagan (1999).CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 7
and the developed world.
7  The “OECD and the World Bank agreed [in
1999] to cooperate in the promotion of improved corporate governance on
a world-wide basis.  Both institutions are committed to assisting
governments in … improving the legal, institutional and regulatory
framework for corporate governance in their countries.  The move responds
to mandates from finance ministers and central bank governors of the G-7
and the OECD countries.”
8
These are valuable initiatives.  They will contribute to reaching their
goals of more stable enterprises and better economic performance.  But
corporate law, and the reach of government policy-makers through
corporate law reform, has limits.  Here we demarcate those limits’
boundaries, beyond which corporate law ceases to be a primary institution.
A. Protecting Minority Stockholders
The basic law-driven story is straightforward: Imagine a nation whose
law badly protects minority stockholders against a blockholder extracting
value from small minority stockholders.  A potential buyer fears that the
majority stockholder would later shift value to itself, away from the buyer.
So fearing, the prospective minority stockholder does not pay pro rata
value for the stock.  If the discount is deep enough, the majority
stockholder decides not to sell, concentrated ownership persists, and stock
markets do not develop.
9 
Or, approach the problem from the owner’s perspective.  Posit large
private benefits of control.  The most obvious that law can affect are
benefits that the controller can derive from diverting value from the firm to
                                                            
7. OECD (1999); Nestor (2001).
8. OECD (1999a); Witherell (2000).  To be clear here, the international
authorities have not solely focused on corporate law, but have attended to governance
practices as well.  E.g., Nestor (2000); WORLD BANK (2000), at 20-24.
9. If the public stock-buyers are non-naive, the selling blockholders are have
contractual means to stymie raiders.  Capped voting, mandatory bids, and poison pills
can reduce or end the buying stockholders’ fears if the nation enforces contract
satisfactorily, even if its corporate law is weak. Moreover, whether the common
law￿as opposed to other non-law-based institutions￿did in fact well protect minority
stockholders during the early development of the public firm is open to question.  See
Roe (2000), at 586 n.124 & 586-93 and (2001).  But here we are making the quality-
of-corporate-law argument, not yet evaluating it.8 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
himself of herself.  The owner might own 51% of the firm’s stock, but
retain 75% of the firm’s value if the owner can over-pay himself or herself
in salary, pad the company’s payroll with no-show relatives, use the firm’s
funds to pay for private expenses, or divert value by having the 51%-
controlled firm over-pay for goods and services obtained from a company
100%-owned by the controller.  Strong fiduciary duties, strong doctrines
attacking unfair interested-party transactions, effective disclosure laws that
unveil these transactions, and a capable judiciary or other enforcement
institution can reduce these kinds of private benefits of control.  (Private
benefits also arise from pride in running and controlling one’s own, or
one’s family’s, enterprise. About this, corporate law has little direct
impact.)
The owner considers whether to sell to diffuse stockholders.  With no
controller to divert value, the stock price could reflect the firm’s underlying
value.  But the rational buyers believe, so the theory runs, that the diffuse
ownership structure would be unstable, that an outside raider would buy
up 51% of the firm and divert value, and that the remaining minority
stockholders would be hurt. Hence, they would not pay full pro rata value
to the owner wishing to sell; and the owner wishing to sell would find that
the sales price to be less than the value of the block if retained (or if sold
intact).
Hence, the block persists.
10  The controller refuses to leave control “up
for grabs” because if it dips below 51% control, an outsider could grab
control and reap the private benefits.
11
                                                            
10. See Bebchuk (1999); cf. La  Porta et al. series, supra note 2.
11. The literature correctly focuses on corporate law’s capacity to contain
controlling stockholder thievery.  Other features of corporate law￿agency theory in
determining who can represent the corporation, corporate transactional flexibility,
limited liability￿are down-played.  Managerial capacity to mismange the corporation
is also down-played, but it is quite relevant.  It tends, improperly, to be ignored in the
current literature.  I will seek to introduce it here to modern analysis of the ownership
separation decision.
The theory has gaps. When the founder is selling out all of his or her stock, the
potential stock buyers discount the purchase, the theory runs, because they anticipate
a raider buying up the stock cheap and then diverting value to itself.  But when raiders
compete, the winning raider will bid the stock up to the value of the private benefits of
control.  Minority buyers would anticipate this competition and pay approximately full
pro rata value for the stock when the founder sells.  (The theory needs non-
competitive—or secret—raiders.)CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 9
B. The Attractions of a Technical Corporate Law Theory
One sees the appeal of the quality of corporate law argument. 
Technical institutions are to blame, for example, for Russia’s and the
transition nations economic problems.  The fixes, if they are technical, are
within our grasp.  Human beings can control and influence the results. 
Progress is possible if we just can get the technical institutions right.  If it
turns out that deeper features of society￿industrial organization and
competition, politics, conditions of social regularity, or norms that support
shareholder value￿are more fundamental, we would feel ill at-ease
because these institutions are much harder for policy-makers to control. 
(To be clear here, I am not speaking simply of corporate law as just the
“law-on-the-books,” but as “law-on-the-books,” including securities law,
and the quality of regulators and judges, the efficiency, accuracy, and
honesty of the regulators and the judiciary, the capacity of the stock
exchanges to manage the most egregious diversions, and so on.
12)
*   *   *
And as self-contained academic theory, there is little to quarrel with
in the quality-of-corporate law argument. It is sparse and appealing. Good
corporate law lowers the costs of operating a large firm; it’s good for a
nation to have it.  But we need more to understand why ownership doesn’t
separate from control even where core corporate law is good enough.
Where managerial agency costs due to potential dissipation are substantial,
concentrated ownership persists even if conventional corporate law
quality is high.
Given the facts that we shall develop in Part III￿there are too many
wealthy, high quality corporate law countries without much separation
￿the quality-of-corporate-law theory needs to be further refined, or
replaced.  This we do next in Part II.
                                                            
12.  The best compendium is in Black (2000).10 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
II.  Its Limits:  Theory
A.  Where Law Does Not Reach: How Managerial Agency
Costs Impede Separation
Managers would badly run some firms if their firms’ ownership
separated from control.  Effective corporate and securities laws constrain
controllers’ stealing, but do much less to directly induce them to operate
their firms well. A related-party transaction can be attacked or prevented
where corporate law is good, but an unprofitable transaction law leaves
untouched, with managers able to invoke corporate law’s business
judgment rule to ward off direct legal scrutiny.
Consider a society (or a firm) where managerial agency costs from
dissipating shareholder value would be high if there’s separation, but low
if there’s no separation, because a controlling shareholder can contain
those costs.  When high but containable by concentration, concentrated
shareholding ought to persist even if corporate law fully protects minority
stockholders from the ravages of dominant stockholders.  Blockholders
would weight their costs in maintaining control (in lost liquidity, lost
diversification, etc.) versus their potential loss in value from managerial
agency costs.  Control would persist even if corporate law were good.
This is a basic but important point, and it is needed to explain the data
that we look at in the next Part.
B.  Improving Corporate Law without Increasing Separation
The arguments in the prior section￿that variance in managerial
agency costs can drive ownership structure even if conventional corporate
law is quite good￿can be stated formally in a simple model.  High
managerial agency costs precludes separation irrespective of the quality
of conventional corporate law. CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 11
1. The model.  Let:
AM  =The managerial agency costs to shareholders from managers’
dissipating shareholder value, to the extent avoidable via concentrated
ownership. 
CCS  =The costs to the concentrated shareholder in holding a block and
monitoring (that is, the costs in lost liquidity, lost diversification,
expended energy, and, perhaps, error).
When AM is high, ownership will persist in concentrated form whether
or not law successfully controls the private benefits that a controlling
shareholder can siphon off from the firm. 
V    = Value of the firm when ownership is concentrated.
BCS  =The private benefits of control, containable by corporate law.
Consider the firm worth V when ownership is concentrated.  Posit first
that managerial agency costs are trivial even if the firm is fully public.  As
such, the private benefits of control, a characteristic legally malleable and
reducible with protective corporate law, can determine whether ownership
separates from control.  Consider the controller who owns 50% of the
firm’s stock.  As such he obtains one-half of V, plus his net benefits of
control.  (In this simple first model, the value of the firm remains
unchanged whether it has a controlling stockholder or is fully public.)  He
retains control when the following inequality is true:
(1) V/2+BCS-CCS>V/2.
The left side is the value to the controlling stockholder of the control
block:  half the firm’s cash flow plus the private benefits diverted from
minority stockholders, minus the costs of maintaining the block (in lost
diversification and liquidity).  The right side is the value he obtains from
selling the block to the public.  Equation (1) states that as long as the
private benefits of control (e.g., in value shifted from minority
stockholders) exceeds the costs of control, then concentrated ownership
persists.  Because corporate law can dramatically shrink the private12 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
benefits, BCS, corporate law matters quite a bit in equation (1).
13  This is
the conventional theory
14 that we shall next amend.
We amend by introducing AM, managerial agency costs from
dissipating shareholder value.  If those managerial agency costs are non-
trivial, then the controllers’ proceeds from selling into the stock market
would be (V-AM)/2.  Concentration persists if and only if
(2)    V/2+BCS-CCS>(V-AM)/2. 
Re-arranging: concentration persists if the net benefits of control (BCS-
CCS) are more than the controller’s costs of diffusion (AM/2):
(3)    BCS-CCS>-AM/2. 
Or, further re-arranging, concentration persists if:
(4) BCS+AM/2> CCS. 
Quality-of-corporate-law theory predicts diffusion won’t occur when
BCS>CCS, with corporate law the means of containing BCS.  But we now
can see the limits to the theory:  True, without agency costs, AM, the level
of private benefits, BCS, can determine whether ownership diffuses or
concentrates.  But where AM is high, diffusion won’t occur even if BCS is
zero, because AM could take-over and drive the separation decision. 
BCS, the controlling shareholder’s private benefits, are relatively
unimportant if AM is very high.  Only when AMﬁ0 do legally malleable
private benefits kick in as the critical determinant.
                                                            
13. Some private benefits are matters of taste, preferences for power, family
recognition in a family firm, etc.  These are not readily containable by law; they might
be better analyzed here as part of the costs of control, CCS, as mitigating the usual costs
(lost diversification, liquidity, etc.) They also might vary from firm-to-firm and nation-
to-nation.  And the capacity to off-load illiquidity and non-diversification might vary
similarly.  Where risks can be hedged, owners should indulge themselves and keep
control more readily than where they cannot.
14. See Bebchuk (1999).CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 13
2. An example.  Agency costs as impeding separation can be
exemplified. Firm has value V of 150 under concentrated ownership, 100
if it’s diffusely owned.  Managers will not steal.  Law is good enough here.
 But they will be loose with shareholders’ investment in the firm. Unlike
a controlling shareholder, they will over-expand, react slowly to changing
markets, and avoid the tough decisions. Hence AM=50.  Consider two
situations for private benefits to the controlling shareholder: in one it’s
high, equal to one-third of the firm; in the other BCS is low, equal to zero.
Table 1:  When agency costs high, private benefits to controlling
shareholder irrelevant; concentration persists even if law drives
down private benefits of control
V, firm’s
value to
shareholders
Value to
50%
owner
Value to
minority
shareholders
Notes
Private benefits low: BCS=0; Managerial agency costs high:  AM=50
Concentrated ownership 150 75 75
Diffuse ownership (AM=50);
controller sells block for 50 100 50 50
Management
loses AM; 
concentration
persists
Private benefits high:  BCS=1/6 of V
Concentrated ownership 150 100 50
Diffuse ownership (AM=50);
controller sells block for 33 100 33 33
Raider grabs
33 (and
perhaps
AM)
15; hence,
concentration
persists
Separation loses shareholders 50 in value.  Because that lost value,
AM, is high, at 50, shareholders would seek, and pay for (in CCS, for
instance) a structure that would preserve those profits for themselves. If
blockholding keeps AM low (which it does as the model defines AM:  the
                                                            
15. Again, this conventional scenario has us assuming that the raider can attack
by secretly accumulating the block or without having to pay stockholders the value it
will acquire.  If raiders compete, the price will be bid up to 100, or perhaps 150, and the
standard corporate law story would fade.  See supra note 9.14 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
agency costs that blockholding would avoid), and if the costs of
blockholding, CCS, are low, blockholding will persist irrespective of
whether private benefits, BCS, are 50, 25, or zero.
True, if the costs of blockholding exceed AM, or if the efficiency
benefits of diffuse ownership overwhelm AM, then private benefits once-
again become relevant.  The most plausible scenario under which they
become relevant is, again, when AMﬁ0.  But when AM, the containable
managerial dissipation, is very high, then this managerial agency cost 
determines whether ownership can separate.
C. Corporate Law’s Limited Capacity to Reduce Agency
Costs
One might reply that core corporate law when improved reduces both
the controlling stockholder’s private benefits (BCS, by reducing the
controller’s capacity to siphon off value) and managerial agency costs (AM,
by reducing the managers’ capacity to siphon off benefits for themselves).
1. The business judgment rule.  This criticism is both right and
wrong, but mostly wrong.  The reason it’s mostly wrong is simple. 
Managerial agency costs are the sum of managers’ thievery (unjustifiably
high salaries, self-dealing transactions, etc.) and their mismanagement. 
Economic analyses typically lump these together and call them “agency
costs.”  But agency costs come from stealing and from shirking.  It is
correct to lump them together in economic analyses as a cost to
shareholders, because both costs are visited upon shareholders.
16  But it
is incorrect to think that law affects each cost to shareholders equally well.
The standard that corporate law applies to managerial decisions is,
realistically, no liability at all for mistakes, absent fraud or conflict of
interest.
17  But this is where the big costs to shareholders of having
managerial agents lie, exactly where law falls into an abyss of silence.
Conventional corporate law does little, or nothing, to directly reduce
shirking, mistakes, and bad business decisions that squander shareholder
                                                            
16. Fama (1980) (agency costs come from “shirking, perquisites or
incompetence”).
17. Dooley & Veasey (1989), at 521 (Veasey is now the Delaware Supreme
Court chief judge); Bishop (1968), at 1095 (managers without a conflict of interest
always win); Rock & Wachter (2001), at 1664-68.CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 15
value.  Elaborate doctrines shield directors and managers from legal action.
 The business judgment rule is, absent fraud or conflict of interest, nearly
insurmountable in America, insulating directors and managers from the
judge, and not subjecting them to scrutiny.
Consider this statement from a well-respected Delaware chancellor:
There is a theoretical exception to [the business judgment rule,
protecting directors and managers from liability] that holds that some
decisions may be so “egregious” that liability … may follow even in the
absence of proof of conflict of interest or improper motivation.  The
exception, however, has resulted in no awards of money judgments
against corporate officers or directors in [Delaware]. … Thus, to
allege that a corporation has suffered a loss … does not state a claim for
relief against that fiduciary no matter how foolish the investment….
18
One does not exaggerate much by saying that American corporate law
has produced only one major instance in which non-conflicted managers
were held liable to pay for their mismanagement:  Smith v. Van Gorkom,
19
a decision excoriated by managers and their lawyers, and promptly
overturned by the state legislature.
20
Nor should we think, “Oh, this is just a gap in American law, one that
could be filled if other legal institutions didn’t sufficiently control these
managerial agency costs.  If the other institutions failed, corporate law
would, and could, jump in.”  One wouldn’t want the judge in there,
regularly second-guessing managers anymore than one would want the
commissar or the bureaucrats in there directing the managers.  Most
American analysts would assume that it would be costly for judges to
regularly second-guess managers’ non-conflicted business decisions.
21
                                                            
18. Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(Allen, J.) (emphasis supplied).
19. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985).  And not just Delaware and not just
recently:  “[I]t is only in a most unusual and extraordinary case that directors are held
liable for negligence in the absence of fraud, or improper motive, or personal interest.”
 Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
20. Del. Corp. Code § 102(b)(7).  And thirty-eight legislatures, aghast at the
possibility of directorial liability if their courts followed Delaware in Smith v. Van
Gorkom, passed similar exemptive legislation.  See Smith (1998), at 289 n.52. 
Corporate casebooks have to go back quite far to find other judicial attacks on
managerial error, much less find managerial judicial defeats.  Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237
N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
21. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (1982) (Winter, J.).16 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
2. Agency costs: shirking and stealing.  Stated more formally: AM
= ALD + AMM), where total managerial agency costs are the sum of legally
controllable diversions, ALD (stealing), and legally uncontrollable
managerial error that dissipates value, AMM (shirking in the economic
literature).  So substituting into (2) above, we obtain:
(5)    V/2+BCS-CCS>(V-ALD-AMM)/2. 
Good basic corporate law reduces BCS and ALD, a component of
agency costs, but it doesn’t touch AMM.  With perfect corporate law, BCS=0
and ALD= 0, which yields:
(6)    V/2-CCS>(V-AMM)/2.
Or:
(7)    AMM/2>CCS .
When (7) holds, ownership does not separate from control, even if a
perfect corporate law reduces the private benefits of control to zero.  And
corporate law does not directly affect AMM.  Good corporate law is
insufficient to induce separation.
*   *   *
One might refine this analysis by adding a term to account for
controlling shareholder error.  One could, but the costs of these errors
would be smaller than legally uncontrollable managerial error.  True,
similar legal doctrines (the business judgment rule) shield the controlling
shareholder from lawsuits for a non-conflicted mistake.  But because the
controlling stockholder owns a big block of the company’s stock, it
internalizes much of the cost of any mistake (unlike the managers).
Because the controlling stockholders, in contrast to the managers, bear the
costs of their error, they immediately internalize their errors, unlike
managers who must be made indirectly to internalize them (via incentive
compensation, labor market constraints and the like).  ControllingCORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 17
shareholders who make many mistakes can sell their firm.
22 Only if the
compensating gains (such as power, prestige, and pride of ownership)
exceed the costs of their errors (and the costs of carrying the block), do they
keep that block of stock.  Managers who make errors do not face such
immediate constraints and incentives.
Simply put: controlling stockholders impose the cost of their stealing
on diffuse stockholders but absorb half of the cost of their own
mismanagement.  Controlling managers impose the cost of their
dissipation, as well as of their thievery, on diffuse stockholders.  Law
reduces stealing, not unconflicted mismanagement.  The point is not that
founders and blockholders never make mistakes, but that they bear most
of the costs of their waste, while managers do not.
D.  Law’s Indirect Capacity to Affect Agency Costs
We have thus far focused on the effects on separation of conventional
corporate law, the law of fiduciary duties, of derivative suits, and of
corporate waste.  Conventional corporate law can reduce stealing and,
where it or a substitute fails to, separation should not be wide.  But even
if it succeeds, managerial agency costs to shareholders could be high and,
when high, ownership cannot readily separate.  Institutions other than
conventional corporate law raise, lower, and control managerial agency
costs, reducing them via competitive markets, shareholder wealth
maximization norms, incentive compensation, hostile takeovers, and
corporate transparency.
For these institutions, law is also relevant.  But its relevance is
indirect.  True, law can potentially encompass everything in a society.  Law
could ban the institutions that indirectly reduce agency costs. Anything can
be taxed, destroyed, and prohibited.
That is, although ordinary but mistaken managerial business decisions
and corporate transactions are immune from any direct judicial attack,
other institutions in society affect these business decisions and
transactions; and law can facilitate or ban these other institutions.  But in
each case, the other institution (the competitive product market, the
                                                            
22. That is, controlling stockholders might manage badly, because they
maximize personal utility not firm value. Cf. Demsetz (1983).  The usual analysis is
that they internalize these costs and would usually sell if they couldn’t manage well.18 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
incentive compensation, the pro-shareholder norm, the hostile takeover) is
the primary control, with law just assisting or impeding that institution.
 But for insider thievery, basic corporate law is a primary deterrent.  It’s
the judge who bars the transfers, orders recovery of the diverted value, and
punishes the wrong-doer.  The judge intervenes directly.  For the indirect
constraints, the judge doesn’t attack directly and often never gets involved
at all.
Consider five major direct constraints on managerial agency costs: 
product market competition, shareholder primacy norms, incentive
compensation, hostile takeovers, and transparency.  Strongly competitive
markets, for example, can be prodded along by good antitrust law, or lost
by bad antitrust law.
23  But the primary constraint is the product market,
not law, and law only acts as a secondary, and perhaps sometimes
inconsequential means of enhancing or demeaning product competition.
And shareholder primacy norms, for example, can be facilitated, or
demeaned by legal pronouncements.  But the norm, not the pronouncement,
is the direct means to affect managerial performance. Or incentive
compensation can be spurred, or taxed. But once again, it’s not the tax rule
that spurs managers directly, but the incentive compensation that pushes
them.  Hostile takeovers can be allowed, or banned.  And again, a market-
player launches the takeover; judges and rules only modulate the offeror’s
chances of success.
24  Transparency can be mandated, or muddled.  Law
obviously can be, or is, in play, albeit indirectly.
Although law affects these institutions, law’s effects here differ from
the effects of conventional corporate law.  First off, they do not directly
invoke the core explanation for good corporate law, namely that it grows
out of common law and the judge’s capacity to control interested-party,
conflict-of-interest transactions that divert corporate value into the
                                                            
23. Strong capital markets can also constrain managers, but I do not add capital
markets here because they are closely connected with good corporate law.
24. Although law affects takeovers, even perfectly pro-shareholder takeover
law will not drive managerial agency costs to zero.  Critics of American corporate law
point to British rules and enforcement structure as being as good for shareholders as
possible.  E.g., Bebchuk & Ferrell (1999), at 1193; DeMott (1983); Miller (1998), at
58.  An indicator of the size of impediments to takeover is the size of the premium
offerors pay to overcome them.  In the United States, the premium in a hostile bid
averages 50%; in Britain it’s noticeably lower at 40%, see Thomson Financial
(database) (accessed Oct. 2001), but if British corporate law is the realistic ideal, there’s
more (40%) impeding a perfectly smooth hostile market than law alone. CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 19
controller’s bank account.  Most importantly, law here doesn’t attack the
cost to shareholders directly (as law does when the judge punishes a
controlling shareholder who diverts value to herself).  Law’s role is not to
attack directly but to enhance or impede the private institution that would
reduce the dissipation. More generally, these institutions (excepting
perhaps basic transparency) have the potential to be politically charged,
and in other nations one or the other or all four are politically charged.
E. Even if Law Critically Affects Both
One might reject the proposition that law is secondary and indirect
here, only enhancing or demeaning the institutions that more directly
control agency costs.  One might believe that law is so central to these
other institutions that control managerial agency costs (competition,
compensation, and so on) that one would be driven to believe that law is
still central to whether public firms can exist and whether ownership can
separate from control.
Bu even so, the structure of my argument persists:  Different
institutions and different laws affect managerial agency costs than the
institutions and laws that affect insider machinations.  The two sets are not
identical.  They barely overlap.  If one society does better with one set that
with the other, the degree of diffusion is deeply affected. Corporate law
might minimize insider transactions, but the other laws might fail to reduce
managerial agency costs.
F.  Precision in Defining Agency Costs and Private Benefits
BCS we’ve defined as the private benefits that a controller can grab
from the firm by diverting value away from the firm’s stockholders.  A
typical such diversion would be for the controller to fully own a private
entity that sells product to the firm at inflated prices.  Dissipating
shareholder wealth isn’t the actor’s goal; shifting that wealth to him or her
is.
But to be precise here as well, dissipation would be a secondary result.
 To make the transfer from the firm into her own pocket, the controller
might have to distort the firm’s operations.  But her primary goal is to
divert, not to dissipate.20 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
AM we’ve defined as the value that managers can dissipate in the firm,
due to mistaken management.  They might over-invest, under-invest, or
mis-invest.  They might over-pay suppliers or fail to adopt profitable
technologies.  They might react too slowly to changing market conditions.
But to be precise here, diversion could still be a secondary result here
too.  The dissipation occurs because the managers could work a little
harder, or a little longer, or take on the tough decisions.  Their action is a
kind of self-dealing, in that they benefit from the easier life. But the
primary effect of AM is to dissipate value; the diversion managers get by
working a little less hard is secondary to the dissipation of shareholder
value.
G. Ambiguity in the Legal Theory: Improving it Can Reduce
Separation
There is more.  Thus far I have accepted the conventional wisdom that
strengthening corporate law facilitates separation across-the-board, in rich,
developed nations as well as in transition and developing ones.  But even
if managerial agency costs are constant (at any initial level of ownership
concentration), a theory of separation based on corporate law is softer here
than the dominant literature has it.  Improving corporate law in the world’s
richest nations is in theory as likely to increase blockholding as to
decrease it.
1.  The offsetting effects.  Recall the core corporate law argument
from Part I.  If minority stockholders are unprotected by corporate law,
they will not buy or will only buy at a discount.  With private benefits of
control high, the controller must hold onto control, because those benefits
cannot be sold (other than by selling the block intact), lest someone else be
able to grab those benefits of control.
In such settings, distant investors invest reluctantly, fewer firms go
public, and those that do will retain a concentrated owner.  For some firms
in some nations when those firms do go public, they set up roadblocks to
a raider entering, via poison pills, capped voting, and mandatory bid rules.
 (Managers oftentimes seek such rules to entrench themselves, but such
rules keep nasty raiders out as well.)
Consider the firm that is public, with pills, caps, and other charter
terms that keep raiders out.  Consider two nations, A and B, with A
protecting minority stockholders imperfectly and less well than B.  (NationCORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 21
A is moving through law-reform from imperfect but not atrocious minority
protection to better minority protection.)  The minority protection
argument tells us that minorities would feel more comfortable in
“protective” nations, such as B, or the reformed A, than in non-
protective nations, such as the old A. Hence, the “better” corporate law
nations could end up with more blockholders in those firms that go public.
More controllers would be willing to go public, because investors, feeling
well protected, would pay full pro rata value for the minority stock that
they would buy. More dispersed stockholders would be willing to accept
a blockholder, because better law would lower the blockholder’s capacity
to rip them off.
Blockholders provide critical good services to the firm and one
powerful bad service: the good ones are monitoring managers,
25 facilitating
information flow from inside the firm to capital owners,
26 and making
implicit deals with stakeholders when soft deals are efficient;
27 their one
big bad activity is their stealing from the minority stockholders.  But if a
nation’s laws limit their potential to do bad without diminishing their
ability to do good, then one could expect that nation’s firms to get more
blockholders, not fewer.
2.  Illustrating the countervailing movement.  Consider the impact of
corporate law improvement on three categories of large-firm ownership:
1.Diffuse
2.Public, but with a dominant stockholder, and
3.Privately-held.
The quality-of-corporate law thesis assumes that law reform would,
monotonically, increase diffusion.  Without satisfactory corporate law
protections, diffuse ownership would be unstable, with a raider able to
capture control and siphon off private benefits.  Large owners (in
categories 2 or 3) therefore cede control only reluctantly.  If a nation
                                                            
25. Shleifer & Vishny (1986), at 465 (“our analysis indicates that [by
monitoring managers] large shareholders raise expected profits and the more so the
greater their percentage of ownership”); Bertrand & Mullainathan (2000) (managers
in firms with blockholding stockholders have less performance-based pay than
managers in firms with blockholders).
26. Roe (1994), at 260-61 (1994) (large owners can mitigate); Stein (1989)
(diffuse ownership creates informational inefficiencies).
27. Cf. Shleifer & Summers (1988).22 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
improves its corporate law, large owners’ reluctance to cede control
diminishes.
But now consider a nation that has plausible but flawed corporate law.
 Some firms are fully public firms in category 1, but most large firms stay
in category 2 or 3.  Corporate law has gaps but it’s good enough for some
public firms, and there are a few.  The diffuse firms use contract to keep
out future blockholders, i.e., capped voting that stops blockholders from
taking control.  Some firms are sufficiently valuable when fully public that
they can absorb the costs of these barriers to controller entry.  But many
firms stay in category 2 or 3, because the dominant owner cannot cheaply
enough construct structures that minimize any future grab for the private
benefits of control.  (Think France, Belgium, or, as usually viewed,
Germany.)
Corporate law (or a substitute, or its enforcement) improves.
28 
Current discourse focuses on the motivations of the owners in the middle
category—those in category 2 that fear a loss of private benefits. No longer
so fearing, they relinquish control.  Ownership diffuses.
This is surely one logical effect of improving corporate law.  But it’s
not the only effect.  Consider first those firms that are already public. They
have devices that minimize the intrusion of blockholders, to impede a
raider from entering to siphon off private benefits.  But with private
benefits less available, the firm could drop its barriers to entry, as the
siphoning—possible when corporate law was weak—is less important
when improved corporate law reduces the private benefits.  A blockholder
can enter if it can add value.
29
This might be especially so if the reason the firm moved from category
2 to category 3 was because of reduced firm value because of the existence
of private benefits.  That is, if shareholders and dominant stockholders
were always wary, always wrestling for position, and sometimes
engineering value-decreasing transactions (by the blockholder to siphon off
value, or by the blockholder to “warranty” to outsiders that it wouldn’t
                                                            
28. Path dependent drags will impede legal change, and if such change occurs,
path dependence will slow change.  Roe (1996); Bebchuk & Roe (1999).  Here we
simply analyze that even without path dependent impediments, improving law propels
the firms in several directions, not just the one conventionally assumed.
29. Not all will, of course.  Path dependence, id., and positional advantage will
deter many.  The point is that the pressures here from improving corporate law don’t
all point toward greater diffusion.CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 23
siphon off value and that hence the outsiders should pay full “pro rata”
value) then the firm might have moved to diffuse ownership as the less
costly alternative.  With this drag on value—blockholder vs. diffuse
stockholder infighting and bonding—removed, the firm could stabilize
with a blockholder.  (We could use the inequalities in the earlier model:
 improving corporate law reduces CCS by eliminating the costs of conflict,
the resulting sub-optimal operating strategies, etc.  Law by lowering those
costs of concentration, would make concentration more viable for more
firms.)
Other movement toward public firms with dominant blockholders
could occur.  Many firms might be in Category 3—privately-held—
because the owners refuse to sell out a discount.  They do not sell for
several reasons:  a) firm value might decline as they are forced to take on
value-minimizing transactions to keep the private benefits flowing to
themselves, b) the outsiders and insiders might not agree on the expected
future private benefits, so the right price might not be obtained.
But with corporate law improved, the blockholder could sell, and
investors could buy, confident that future rip-offs would be minimal.  With
future rip-offs minimal, value-decreasing transactions could not occur (or
would occur less frequently and less severely).  Hence, more initial public
offers would be made.  And with future rip-offs minimal, the sellers and
investors could focus on fundamental value, instead of the future division
of the pie, in pricing the stock in the initial public offer and thereafter.
To illustrate, consider a nation with 30 large firms.  Ten are diffusely-
held, ten are public but with blockholders, ten are fully private. In the
commonly used indices of diffusion, this nation would have a .5 (i.e., of the
twenty largest public firms, ten have blockholders).
Corporate law improves.  As suggested by current theory and intuition
then, five of the blocks diffuse in the public firms with blocks.  Ownership
for these five fully separates.  Owners can at last sell out at full value,
because they don’t have to worry about a future raider grabbing control and
the concomitant private benefits. 
If that were the only move, then the standard index of diffusion  would
jump to .75. 
But consider the ten firms that were fully public.  Five now can afford
blockholders because the dissipation of value from infighting would
decline, and the blockholder would add value.  If this were the second24 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
move, then the index would, when smoke cleared and all the separation
adjustments were made, end up right back where it began, at .5.
But that’s not all.  Of the ten firms that were fully private (category 3),
five owners decide that they can take the firm public and, under the newly-
improved corporate law regime, investors readily buy up the stock. When
this third set of transactions is completed, that nation would have five ten
fully-public firms and fifteen public but block-held firms.  Five firms
would remain completely private.  The index of diffusion would have
dropped from .5 to .4.
30  Improving corporate law would thereby reduce
the density of separation in that nation’s public firms.
31
And some fully public firms might go private, because they know that
one barrier to cashing in on any improvement in the firm value—the
difficulty of taking the firm public later—has been removed. (Public to
private to public ownership again does happen in the United States.)
To summarize:  One effect of improving corporate law is that public
firms with blockholders could more easily transit to fully diffuse firms. 
This is just what current theory, intuition, and policy-making would
predict.
But that’s only one of the effects; overall, improving corporate law has
ambiguous effects on diffusion.
This may not just be idle theory: “The mean percentage of common
stock held by a [U.S.] firm’s officers and directors as a group rose from 13
percent in 1935 to 21 percent in 1995.  Median holdings doubled from 7
                                                            
30. Because the standard index only looks at the 20 largest firms, we assume
here that the size distribution is random.  Hence, the top twenty would include 4 of the
previously public firms and 4 of the old public but concentrated firms that went diffuse.
 The public but diffuse category would include 4 diffuse firms that took on a now more-
trusted blockholder, 4 that stayed with their old structure, and 4 previously private firms
that decided that could now handle an IPO but would stay with block ownership.
31. In addition, some diffusely-held firms might go private.  They didn’t do so
before because of reasons that improved corporate law would eliminate:  a) the firm’s
charter barred going private because when corporate law was weak going private was
too dangerous in its potential to rip-off public stockholders.  And b) the engineers of the
going private would have been reluctant to take their firm private, because they would
have had more difficulty doing a later IPO when it became warranted.  Exit barriers
(i.e., via going public later) are entry barriers (i.e., to taking the firm private now).  But
with corporate law improved, these two considerations fade in importance. Bottom line:
 Improving corporate law could decrease the incidence of diffusion in public firms from
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percent to 14 percent.”
32  As corporate law improved in the United States
in the 20
th century through better securities laws and enforcement, for
example, from passable to very good, blockholding increased.
*   *   *
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Table 2. Indeterminate effect of better corporate law in rich nation.
Type of firm ownership
Diffuse
public
Blockholder
but public
Fully
private
Index of
concentration
of public firms
Time 1.  Country begins with serviceable but not excellent corporate law
1. Initial ownership distribution 10    10    10 .5 (10/20)
Time 2.  Corporate law improves
2a. 5 blockholders sell out 15 5    10 .75 (15/20)
2b. Caps, pills removed; 5
public firms get blocks 10 10    10 .5 (10/20)
2c. 5 fully private go public but
blockholder remains 10 15  5 .4 (10/25)
2d. 5 fully public go fully
private in LBO’s 5 15     10 .25 (5/20)
More starkly: concentrated blockholders have two major roles inside
the firm: they steal from stockholders and they monitor managers. Minority
stockholders would see a trade-off and reduce the price they’d pay
accordingly: pay more to the extent monitoring raises firm value, but less
to the extent the blockholder steals from the minority.  But if law limits the
negative possibility￿less, or no, shareholder stealing, because law
protects the minority stockholders￿then that good law should make
stockholders more comfortable, not less comfortable, with blockholders.
Private owners would feel more comfortable in selling some stock because
they would be able to get full, pro rata value for it, rather than the discount
that buyers would insist upon in bad-law regimes.  Improving corporate
law should, in such settings, all else equal, increase, not decrease, the
incidence of blockholding.
This offsetting effect from improving corporate law doesn’t tell us that
improving it is bad.  (Getting more public firms for a nation and separating
ownership from control is not inherently good.)  Ownership choice and
shareholder welfare expand by improving corporate law. So improving it
is worthwhile.
But one could not measure the increased quality of corporate law by
measuring the change in the number of public firms and the density ofCORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 27
separation over time.  Corporate law might improve, and its very
improvement might diminish the density of separation.
H. The Tight Limits to the Purely Legal Theory
Thus, using poor minority protection from a controller’s diversion of
value to explain why blocks persist in Russia is sufficient and convincing,
but for Western Europe is fuzzy, or maybe wrong.  If blocks persist, one
cannot a priori know whether they persist because minority stockholders
fear the controller, or because they fear the managers, who might dissipate
shareholder value if the controlling stockholder disappears.  Even if better
corporate law usually increases diffusion in rich nations with adequate but
not outstanding corporate law (a proposition open to theoretical
challenge
33), concentration might be due to high managerial agency costs
and have little to due with core corporate law’s constraints on insider
machinations.
If distant shareholders fear unrestrained managers, the controller
cannot sell stock at a high enough price and thus she keeps control to
monitor managers or to run the firm.
III. Its Limits: Data
If we could measure the quality of corporate law, then we could see
whether ownership is concentrated where corporate law protects
shareholders and diffuse where it does not. True, if diffusion correlated
with high-quality law, the primacy of the law-as-cause thesis would not be
proven: when ownership is made diffuse for some other reason (say,
technology or, say, politics) then the diffuse owners may demand legal
protections.  Corporate law might follow, not lead, market development.
But if, among nations with satisfactory corporate law, ownership is still
concentrated in several, we would need more than just the legal theory to
explain the result.
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A. Measuring Quality
1. Corporate law: what counts?  Judging how well corporate law
protects minority stockholders across nations by examining their corporate
law is hard. Not only must one judge which laws are critical (how did
Britain succeed without a derivative suit, the very institution that plaintiff-
oriented counsel in the U.S. would cite as a sine qua non? and one that
France, seen as a weak corporate law nation by American analysts,
allows?
34), but interaction effects can make a rule that is a loophole in one
nation into a roadblock in another. Or a protection might be missing, but
an even stronger substitute might be present.  Moreover, the rules-on-the-
books could be identical in two nations but if the quality of enforcement
(because of a corrupt, incompetent, or inefficient judiciary or regulatory
system) might make the bottom line protections differ greatly. Or practices
not required by a nation’s corporate law could protect shareholders: a legal
index might look bad, but the reality could be the opposite if contract,
corporate charter terms, or business practices counter-act a deficient
corporate law.
Undaunted by lawyers’ skepticism that one can qualitatively assess
corporate law directly, finance-oriented students of corporate governance
built legal indices for many nations. They have accomplished a major
undertaking, one that should embarrass many (of us) corporate law
professors who have not even attempted what the financial economists
have completed. They have argued convincingly that corporate law
institutions are weak in many third world and transition nations, that these
weaknesses cripple securities markets.
35  These studies have also been
interpreted, less convincingly, as showing weak corporate law to be the
primary culprit for the weak securities markets on the European continent.
 Not only do corporate players in France, Germany, and Scandinavia think
                                                            
34. Art. L225-252 C. Com.; Art. 200, Decree No. 67-236 of March 23, 1967,
J.O. March 24, 1967, p. 2843 (France); Stengel (1998) (Germany). Germany has the
derivative suit in theory (in that the company must bring suit when 10% of the
stockholders seek that it do so), but in practice it just isn’t used.  Id.
35. La Porta et al. series, supra note 2, and the followers. Economically less
developed countries have added reasons why they haven’t developed securities markets.
 Good securities and corporate rules might come with wealth, and not the other way
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their corporate law is fine, but they sometimes proclaim its superiority in
some dimensions over the American variety.
36
The indexers consciously do not seek to measure the bottom-line
quality of each nation’s corporate law but uses a handful of proxies: 
Possibly the index focuses on rules that aren’t right at the core of
shareholder protections, but rather on proxies for a total set of institutions
that protect shareholders, a set for which there might be more direct
measures.  Improvement is possible.
37
Organized qualitative analysis challenges legal academics’ preference
for nuance and discussion.
38  Anecdotes abound, and one can find
anecdotes of fleeced minority stockholders on both sides of the Atlantic.
39
One can list differing rules, but it’s difficult to know a) which rules are
substitutes and, hence, which countries truly have gaps in protection, b)
which rules really count, c) the extent to which players follow announced
rules, and d) whether the rules in focus are the kind that securities market
                                                            
36. Tunc (1982) (French law bans dangerous transactions that American
judges weigh, balance, and sometimes approve); cf. Agnblad, Berglöf, Högfeldt &
Svancar (2000) (not even anecdotes of insider machinations in Sweden).
37. Wall Street lawyers might have reservations about heavily using preemptive
rights, cumulative voting, and the minimum percentage needed to call a special
shareholder meeting—items not likely to be near the top of most American lawyers’
lists of Delaware corporate law’s most important legal protections—and of partly
abandoning Delaware law for the index. (The index uses Delaware corporate law
except on the minimum percentage needed to demand a meeting.) Delaware allows
firms to decide the issue by specifying a low percentage in their charter, a right that, I
understand, firms rarely use.  Sticking with Delaware here would have made Delaware
corporate law protection look mediocre, when it’s probably pretty good.  The point isn’t
that Delaware is bad—the index probably hits the right bottom line—but that
developing an accurate index is hard.
For a critique more skeptical than mine of the index, one that is probably more in
line with legal academic views than mine, see Detlev Vagts, Comparative Corporate
Law—The New Wave, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR JEAN-NICOLAS DRUEY (edited by Rainer
Schweitzer and Urs Gasser) (forthcoming, 2002). Vagts argues that the coding
judgments for the German index are incorrect.  For instance, although German
stockholders are viewed as unable to vote by mail, most send their instructions in to
their bank (by mail) and the bank then votes the stockholders.  Hence, German
corporate law is “better” than the index suggests.
38. E.g., Tunc (1982). 
39. Cf. Norris (2000); Stewart (1992), at 119-27 (machinations of Victor
Posner in NVF, DWG, Pennsylvania Engineering, APL, Royal Crown and Sharon
Steel).30 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
players demand up front as necessary to build securities markets, or
whether the rules are just the polish on financial markets that comes once
deep securities markets exist for other reasons. Some rules are window-
dressing, some really bind. Which is which?
2. Corporate law: The bottom line.  Can we measure the bottom-line,
overall quality of corporate law?  If we knew the nation-by-nation average
premium for control and could compare it to the value of the traded stock,
one would have a bottom-line number for the value of control in a firm.  In
nations where the premium is high, we’d surmise corporate law or its
enforcement is inferior; in nations where that premium over the price
available to diffuse stockholders is low, we’d surmise corporate law is
superior.
Consider a firm worth $100 million, with a 51% blockholder who
values that block at $60 million and minority stock that trades for an
aggregate value of $40 million.  If we can observe those numbers, we have
roughly measured the value of control: the controller plausibly pays the
10% premium (measured as a percentage of total firm value) because he
or she can divert 10% of the firm’s value from minority stockholders into
his or her own pocket. If one could measure this difference across nations,
then one would have a “bottom-line” number indicating the value of
control. If the quality of corporate law were the, or a, principal determinant
of separation, then nations with high gaps between the value of control and
the value of the minority stock would have more concentrated ownership
than nations where that gap is weak.
40
B. Data:  Nations with Good Corporate Law but Without
Separation
1. Market measures of the value of control. We have data on the
value of a control block.  Researchers have looked at the premium paid for
                                                            
40. The measurement of the private benefits of control and, hence, of law’s
ability to keep those benefits low will be imperfect.  Some of the premium could come
from the cost of assembling a block.  Some of the premium may come from the
controller’s power to decide, say, when to sell, although the sale would be made at a fair
price for all.  If the transaction costs are high, then a pre-assembled block should
command a premium because it side-steps the transaction costs.  Hence, high premia
may over-state law’s weakness because some fraction of the premium come from
unrelated transaction costs, not from uncontrolled private benefits.CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 31
a voting block over the pre-trading price. In the United States, it was found
to be 4% of the firm’s value.
41  For Italy parallel research suggests a
premium of 25 to 30% or more,
42 a premium consistent with the quality-of-
corporate-law theory (since ownership is concentrated there and corporate
law apparently poor).
But in Germany, the control block premium was recently, and
surprisingly, found to be about 5% of the firm’s value,
43 inconsistent with
the corporate law theory, because German ownership is quite
concentrated.
44  To be sure here, the data could under-state the private
benefits: benefits might have already been taken before the sale and, hence,
the sales price wouldn’t reflect them.  And firms for which blocks are sold
could be those with low private benefits, while those where diversion is
high don’t trade.  But even the reduced fact remains that for those blocks
sold, the future private benefits are expected to be about equal to those
expected in American block trades.
So, the block premium in Germany is about 5% of firm value; that in
the United States is 4%. We should pause at this finding for Germany.
That number casts doubt on the pure-form of the law-driven theory,
because Germany, the world’s third largest national economy, has very
concentrated ownership.  If control blocks trade at such a low premium,
perhaps something else induces concentration to persist.
An explanation for Germany is that German codetermination￿by
which labor gets half of the seats in boardrooms of large firms￿fits snugly
with concentrated shareholding as a counter-balance in large, especially
large smoke-stack, industries.
45  That 5% premium is less than the decline
                                                            
41. Barclay & Holderness (1989).
42. Nicodano & Sembenelli (2000).  See also Zingales (1994) (premium for
voting stock).  The Italian number comes from the voting premium for dual-class
common stock.  More about that below. 
43. Franks & Mayer (2000), at 24.
44. The premium is the difference between block price and the trading value
of the diffusely held stock.  American blocks traded at a 20% premium over he price of
diffuse stock, for blocks of (typically) one-fifth of the firm’s stock.  If the premium
represents what the controller can grab for itself, the blockholder would be able to grab
4% of the firm’s value (one-fifth of 20%).  German blocks are larger, with many equal
to half of the company’s stock.  A premium of 10% for half of the company, the typical
numbers, indicates the controller could grab 5% of the firm’s value for itself.
45. Roe (1999).32 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
in shareholder value measured when Germany enhanced its co-
determination statute in 1976 and increased employee representation in the
boardroom from one-third to one-half.
46
The low German 5% control premium also shows why constructing an
index for corporate law quality is so hard.  To divert big value, the
controlling shareholder typically needs a big transaction￿a buyout, a
merger, a related party sale of good or services. And to get a big
transaction through a firm, one needs board approval and, hence, a
compliant board.  Because the majority stockholder in the United States
typically appoints the entire board, it’s plausible to expect it to control a
compliant board.  But in Germany the blockholder can never control the
full board, because German law mandates that labor get half of it, and the
practice is that banks holding their brokerage customers’ proxies get some
board seats. Other German corporate law features might be weak, thereby
generating an appearance of weak corporate law protections in a cross-
country index.  But even so, the German blockholder may be stymied in
pushing a related-party transaction through because he or she cannot
control the full German board. Interaction effects impede putting our finger
on one or two key features as indicative of whether technical corporate law
is overall good or bad.
Two other researchers use a differing methodology, but come up with
similar data. They investigate the effects of ownership concentration in 100
of Germany’s public firms.   They conclude that moving a German firm
from diffuse to concentrated ownership would double the value of the
firm’s shares.
47 Increases in ownership concentration typically benefit the
diffuse stockholders.  That’s a story that fits quite poorly with a poor-
corporate-law theory,
48 but quite nicely with a managerial agency cost
theory.
                                                            
46. FitzRoy & Kraft (1993); Gorton & Schmid (2000); Schmid & Seger
(1998); but see Baums & Frick (1999); Frick, Speckbacher & Wentges (1999).
47. Edwards & Weichenrieder (1999).
48. It could fit with the poor corporate law theory if a) corporate law was poor,
but b) big blockholders desisted from transferring value to themselves, while c) small
blockholders insisted on massively transferring such value.  Plausible, yes (big
blockholders incur  more deadweight costs if the transfers demean total firm value), but
this confluence would seem implausible as accounting for all, or even most of, the
doubling of value to minority stockholders of blockholding.CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 33
All of the new German data on control block premium presents a
counter-example, and a very big one, to the law-driven theory.  Counter-
examples are important, but perhaps there is some German-specific factor,
not replicated elsewhere, that could make the theory generally true, but just
inapplicable in Germany. To check, we turn to other data.
2. Dual class common stock.  Corporate law’s effectiveness can be
roughly measured otherwise.  Some firms issue dual class common stock.
 Class A stock votes, class B stock doesn’t, but both have the same
dividend rights.  (Variations abound.) A controller cannot reap benefits by
controlling the class B stock, but can by controlling class A stock. Both are
formally entitled to the same cash coming out from the company.  If the
value of class A stock is higher than that of B’s, we have a measure of the
value that the controller can surreptitiously divert from outside
shareholders to herself.  Good law should keep that value low.  If we could
measure the differences across nations, we’d have an indicator measuring
the quality of corporate law in controlling the ravages of a dominant
stockholder, as one Nobel Prize winner sought to do a few years ago.
49
More specifically: Posit a $100 million company issues 500,000
shares of class A stock, which vote, and 500,000 shares of class B stock,
which doesn’t.  If the diversionary benefit of control is near zero, then the
difference A stock and B stock should trade at the same price. If law is
weak and control allows the controller to divert $10 million in value from
the minority stockholders into his own pocket, then A stock should trade
for about $60 million in the aggregate, the class B stock for $40 million.
  The quality-of-corporate-law theory would then predict that, in gross, as
the private value of control went up, ownership concentration would
increase.  And vice versa: as the value of control decreased, controllers
would loosen their grip and ownership would diffuse.
Unpublished voting premium data has recently become available. 
Table I shows the voting premium in the world’s richer nations.  Italy’s
and France’s voting premium is high, America’s low—a difference
consistent with the legal theory, as Italy is said to have poor protections
                                                            
49. Modgiliani & Perotti (1997 or 1998), at 525, who sought to prove that the
dual class premium varied with the quality of a nation’s security market.  They had a
smaller, and less up-to-date sample of seven nation’s voting premia.  The current dual
class data better measures the premia and the implied quality of legal protections, but
as we shall see shortly it still doesn’t predict the degree to which ownership separates
from control.34 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
and has concentrated ownership, and the United States the converse.   But
this new data increases the tension for the legal theory; Germany is a weak
corporate law nation in the finance economists’ indices, but the dual class
numbers here again show it protects non-voting stockholders rather well,
vindicating defenders of the quality of German corporate law.  And not just
Germany:  Four Scandinavian nations all have very concentrated
ownership but protect minority stockholders well.
Table 3:  Voting premium and ownership separation
50
Country Voting
premium
Portion of large firms that
are widely-held
Australia 0.23 0.65
Canada 0.03 0.60
Denmark 0.01 0.40
Finland 0.00 0.35
France 0.28 0.60
Germany 0.10 0.50
Italy 0.29 0.20
Norway 0.06 0.25
Sweden 0.01 0.25
Switzerland 0.05 0.60
United Kingdom 0.10 1.00
United States 0.02 0.80
Source: Voting premium data comes from Nenova (2000); the ownership concentration
data comes from La Porta et al., supra note 2.  The percentage of widely-held firms for
a nation is the percentage of the nation’s twenty largest firms that have a 20% or larger
blockholder.
This dual class premium data casts doubt on whether a uni-variable
model is enough to explain the richer nations’ degree of ownership
separation.  True, further confirmation, with data collected by other
researchers, should be added.  And the number of observations￿a dozen
                                                            
50. The voting premium measures the percentage excess of the trading price
of voting stock over non-voting stock. Technical cautions for this data are raised and
discussed infra at notes 51 and 56 and accompanying text (comparing price of minority
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or so of the richer nations￿isn’t enough to allow crosschecks and controls
to weight competing factors.
And the dual class data as measuring the value of control is soft.  If
the controller has a majority of the class A voting stock, then the
researchers are observing the trading value of the minority stockholders on
the class A level, and comparing that data to the trading value of the non-
voting class B stock.  But the minority class A stockholder is not a
controller, it just has a chance of sometime joining a control block.
51
Thus while this is the best data set available, it is not perfect data. 
(Data sets never are.)  We can take comfort in that ancillary information
comports with the numbers. The American premium is low, and U.S.
corporate and securities law is usually seen as highly protective.  The
Swedish premium is low as well, and Swedish researchers assert that there
are not even anecdotal instances of controllers shifting value to themselves.
 Two Scandinavian researchers tell us that “the value of control does not
derive from the possibility to expropriate the fringe of minority
shareholders … [but] has to be motivated by some other economic
motives.”
52  Other Swedish researchers report that:
Outside shareholders do not refrain [from] investing on the Stockholm
Stock Exchange since 55% of the Swedish population own shares …
and 33% of outstanding shares are owned by foreign investors… . 
[T]he ratio of the stock market capitalization held by minority
shareholders in relation to GDP … is  0.51 for Sweden compared to
0.58 for the U.S.  …  [I]t is not likely that weak investor protection has
hampered financial market development in Sweden….
53
The other Scandinavian nations have similar reputations, and they also
have low premiums.  Moreover, the leading blockholding Swedish investor
typically uses dual class stock, but not in a way that locks up control:  the
Wallenberg family holding company doesn’t take majority control but
more typically ends up with 5% of the cash flow and 25% (not a majority)
                                                            
51. Statistical analyses could try to control this problem, by observing the value
of the vote when control is incomplete, i.e., what’s the premium for the minority of
stock A when there’s a 40% shareholder.  The incomplete control means that the other
stock’s vote could be decisive for a controlling coalition.  See Nenova (2000); Zingales
(1994).  Such calculations are inherently imprecise.
52. Bergström & Rydqvist (1990) (emphasis supplied).
53. Holmén & Högfeldt (1999), at 39 (emphasis supplied).36 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
of the votes,
54 leaving potential control in the other 75% of the votes.  And
although the German premium is low compared to the usual prejudice, it
comports with the control block premium recently measured by two leading
financial researchers.
55 The voting premiums in the world’s poorer nations,
which one could believe to be in the process of developing securities
markets, are high.
56
*   *   *
To repeat a proviso:  I hardly mean that this data tells us that high-
quality corporate and securities law is irrelevant. Rather, it’s that some rich
nations have high quality corporate and securities law but ownership still
remains close and securities ownership does not diffuse. The point in this
Part is not that good corporate law is irrelevant in the world’s richer
nations￿it keeps the costs of running a big enterprise low￿but when it’s
already pretty good, subtle gradations in its quality do not determine
                                                            
54. Leser & Rocco (2000).
55. Franks & Mayer (2000), at 24.  They attribute concentrated ownership to
the high private benefits of control, although the benefit they found, 10%, is on the low-
side world-wide.  Other researchers recently found German bankers able to extract little
in private benefits of control.  Gorton & Schmid (2000), at 70.
The density of dual class usage could indicate which propellant—private benefits
or managerial agency costs—is central. If control is usually had via dual class stock (or
pyramids) that might indicate that extraction of private benefits is primary.  But this
would be so only if the controller pulls his or her wealth out of the firm.  If managerial
agency costs are high, control with some financial commitment is important for firm
value:  if wealth constraints mean the controller cannot commit most of the family’s
wealth and still influence managers, then dual class could be privately efficient for
managerial agency cost reasons.
56. And, as long as the “real” premium varies in tandem from nation-to-nation
then, even if the data under-states the premium, country-by-country comparisons can
be made.  We can take some further comfort with the data in that a well-known winner
of the Nobel Prize thought it the best available way to measure legal quality.  He was,
however, working with what has become stale data.  Modgiliani & Perotti (1997 or
1998), 524-25.
Data measuring the value of the vote can be corrected to reflect that the minority
voting stock represents the probably of joining a control group and not the direct value
of control.  The value of control rises or falls with the of the control block: in a country
where 51% of the voting stock can control everything, the value of minority voting
stock should approach that of non-voting stock; but if there are two voting blocks of
40%, the minority voting stock’s value should reflect the value of control. 
Sophisticated tests can approximate the correction. See Zingales (1994).CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 37
whether ownership diffuses. Something else is more important, with the
leading alternative being that high managerial potential to dissipate
precludes separation even if corporate law is good.
3. Control block premium.  Other new data on corporate law quality
is also suggestive, and not helpful to a pure corporate law thesis.
The premium in a block sale could reveal the quality of the governing
corporate law.  Consider a controller who owns 50% of a $7,500 company
with 100 shares, and sells her 50 shares not at $75 per share, but at $100
per share, when the dispersed stock trades at $50 per share.  The $50 per
share premium could be seen as measuring the private benefits of control,
benefits that better corporate law would force the controller to share pro
rata with all of the firm’s stockholders.  The controller could plausibly
siphon off $50/share x 50 shares in value, or $2,500 of the firm’s total
value of $7,500.  The premium is 33% of the company’s value.
If instead the controller’s 50 shares sold for $80 per share while
dispersed stock sold for $70 per share, then we could calculate that the
market was expecting that the controller could siphon off $250 (from 50
shares x $10/share), or 3.3% of the firm’s value.
As always, other considerations could be in play, but we would
surmise that the first scenario is one of weak corporate law, the second one
of (relatively) stronger corporate law.  (We’d have to be careful that we
weren’t reading data in which only the control sale was regulated, while
rampant shifts occurred elsewhere:  If the relevant corporate law forced a
mandatory bid for dispersed stock upon a control shift, the premium might
be low, but incumbent controllers could still be otherwise shifting value.
 So the better data would measure the results before mandatory bids
became common; or would measure control sales not subject to the
mandatory bid, i.e., sales of less than the typical 30% trigger.)
Two financial economists have just accumulated such data, in an
important undertaking.  Here, in the last two columns, is what they have
for the world’s richer nations:38 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
Table 4.  Control premia and ownership separation.
Country
(1)
Widely-held at
20% for Med
Corps
(2)
Mean premium as
a fraction of total
equity
(3)
Mean premium
from col. 3,
"corrected" for
industry effects
Australia 0.30 0.02 0.04
Austria 0.00 0.38 0.34
Canada 0.60 0.01 -0.04
Denmark 0.30 0.08 0.03
Finland 0.20 0.10 -0.01
France 0.00 0.02 0.04
Germany 0.10 0.10 0.02
Italy 0.00 0.37 0.30
Japan 0.30 -0.04 -0.04
Netherlands 0.10 0.02 0.02
Norway 0.20 0.01 0.04
Sweden 0.10 0.06 0.03
Switzerland 0.50 0.06 -0.06
United Kingdom 0.60 0.02 0.04
United States 0.90 0.02 0.04
med20 Block premium/
equity value
Source: Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Why are Private Benefits of Control so Large in
Certain Countries and What Effect Does this Have on their Financial Development (working
paper, 2001).
Even a cursory examination shows no persistent pattern.  If the sample
only had, say, Austria, Italy, the U.S., and the U.K., we would get a nice
pattern for the corporate law thesis:  Austria and Italy have concentrated
ownership and high sale-of-control premiums; the U.S. and the U.K. have
low premiums and low ownership concentration.  For these four nations,
there’s an excellent fit for a quality-of-corporate-law thesis, suggesting it
has some importance.
But the other wealthy nations also have low sale-of-control premiums,
despite that most of them have concentrated ownership.  Take a look at
the Scandinavian nations again:  low premium for control, high
concentration.  And take a look at Germany and Switzerland:  fairly low
premia, but concentrated ownership for Germany and middling-CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 39
concentration for Switzerland.  And in this sample, both the Netherlands
and France, countries with concentrated ownership, don’t look bad in
protecting minority stockholders.   Overall, the “sign” of the relationship
is as corporate law theory would predict, but the significance is low, and
the portion of the variation explained (12%) is quite low.
(The last column adjusts the premium for industry type:  some
industries are more likely to “naturally” protect dispersed shareholders,
other industries are riskier for them.  The adjustments refine the index but
do not radically change the results:  Austria and Italy still have the largest
premiums; the U.S. and the U.K. are still at the protective end of the
spectrum.  Some of the middle range nations change rank: Germany and
Finland look more protective; most other changes meander.)
The following shows the relationships graphically and the statistical
results.  (Similar results came from seeing the extent to which the block
premium predicted stock market capitalization:  Pretty good results overall,
but the results are “driven” by Italy and Austria.)
Graph 1.  Block premium vs. ownership dispersion.
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Technical data: med20 v. control premium
Regression y = -1.02x + .36
Adj R-Sq -.12
t-stat -1.71*
*  Not significant.       P value =  .11.40 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
Graph 2.  Block premium vs. ownership dispersion (without Italy and
Austria.
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Technical data: med20 v. control premium (without Italy and Austria)
Regression y = -1.58x + ,38
Adj R-Sq -.02
t-stat -0.84*
*  Not significant.          P value = .42.
If control premia were our only data, and our only way to measure the
quality of corporate law, we’d be driven to conclude that that corporate law
quality only weakly explained the variation in ownership dispersion and
the strength of securities markets in the world’s richest nations.  Something
else is as, or more, important.
4.  And the not-so-rich nations? One might observe that many poorer
nations have decrepit corporate law institutions.  This is true, and possibly
weak corporate law is keeping them back, but the coincidence of bad law
and a bad economy does not tell us enough. To learn that, say,
Afghanistan, has poor corporate law doesn’t tell us whether its weak
economy is primarily due to its weak corporate law or to its other weak
institutions.  If the other institutions, particularly the other property rights
institutions are decrepit, these may be the critical debilities preventing
Afghanistan from developing the wealth and sufficiently complex private
institutions that get it ready to start needing public firms and ownership
diffusion.  Only then, when it gets that far, will we be able to tell whether
weak corporate law holds it back.  The omitted variable might be weakCORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 41
property rights institutions generally, with weak corporate law institutions
just being a visible, and perhaps minor, surface manifestation of the deeper
weakness.
5. Enforcing contracts.  Bad law sufficiently explains weak securities
markets where law is so weak that basic contracts cannot be enforced￿as
they cannot be in contemporary Russia, many transition economies, and
significant parts of the less developed world￿thereby rendering complex
corporate institutions impossible.
57  This is important because a) the
quality of contract and corporate law ought to correlate and b) much that
is useful in corporate law can be built out of good contract law, either
directly by public authorities or indirectly by private parties.
Many of the same nations that by measurement have good corporate
law also have good contract law. All the Scandinavian nations, Germany,
and several other continental European countries enforce contract as well
as the United States does.
58  This casts more doubt on whether the quality
of corporate law thesis explains enough of why ownership separates or
doesn’t in the world’s richer nations.  Contract law seems good, and
corporate law, which also seems good, is in many dimensions a special
form of contract law.  Nations that can build one should be able to build
the other.  And the rudiments of a corporate law can, in primitive form, be
built out of contract.
Studies of business climate are consistent:  continental Europe and the
Anglo-Saxon basic business institutions are generally seen as equally
business-friendly, but the continental European labor markets are seen as
much less business-friendly (and that unfriendliness can raise managerial
agency costs, as we shall see in the next section).
59
Nor is it logically correct to assume that where corporate rules are
weakly enforced, that weakness is the primary cause for weak stock
markets in nations that have already built satisfactory contract and property
                                                            
57. Black & Kraakman (1996) (Russia); Sachs & Pistor (1997), at 3.
58.  O’Driscoll, Holmes & Kirkpatrick (2001), at 18 (Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the United States protect private property and contract
strongly and have a largely efficient legal systems). The index, a crude one, purports to
measure both property rights and “the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce
contracts.” Id. at 57.  Cf. Levine (1999), at 14-15, 20 (risk that government will not
respect a contract it has signed:  low for the United States, but lower for France,
Germany, and Scandinavia).
59. Sachs & Warner (1998), at 24.42 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
institutions.  Were the demand for diffuse ownership sufficiently strong in
such nations, investors and firms could try to build the institutions needed
for good securities markets.  If societies that successfully built other
complex business and legal institutions, especially those that effectively
enforce commercial contracts, did not try to build these corporate law
institutions, then a deeper reason might explain why they did not try.
Thus, one could synthesize the legal and managerial agency costs
theories into a two-step argument:  When corporate law, contract law, and
court systems are decrepit, public firms will not emerge, because the
system fails to protect minority stockholders.  This describes many third-
world and transition nations.  But when either contract or basic corporate
law becomes satisfactory, as it is in several western European nations and
the United States, then whether a nation builds on what it has (by writing
complex contracts, by further improving corporate law, or by developing
the ancillary institutions such as stock exchanges or effective
intermediaries), becomes a question of whether the underlying potential for
low managerial agency costs to shareholders makes it profitable for the
players to do so.
C. What Beyond Law is Needed for Separation in the Wealthy
West?
I have argued here that corporate law could be fine and ownership
might still not separate from control.  Corporate law does not readily
control the important managerial agency costs of dissipating shareholder
value.  For firms for which these costs to shareholders are high, ownership
will not readily separate from control.  For nations where these costs are
systematically high, separation is more rare than where these costs are low.
 It is more rare even if corporate law quality is high. Corporate law is
insufficient to induce separation.  Other conditions have to be met.  Here
for the sake of completeness I briefly outline the other conditions.
1. Economic preconditions.  Economic and technological conditions
must yield a demand for public firms with lots of capital.  If the economy
is too poor to have such a demand (many nations still are in this category)
or if the reigning technologies do not demand large economies of scale,
then public firms won’t be sought.  Moreover, the distribution of wealthCORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 43
and income must be flat relative to the demand for large firms.
60  Strongly
competitive product markets keep managerial agency costs lower than
weakly competitive product markets.  In the latter, managers have much
slack; in competitive markets, they don’t.
2. Political preconditions. Some modern societies are rich, have
technological demands for large firms, but their politics stymies separating
ownership from control.  In strong social democracies, politics drives a
wedge between shareholders on the one side, and managers and employees
on the other side.  Politics there presses firms to expand, to avoid down-
sizing, and to avoid disrupting employment conditions. These are just the
kind of goals that unconstrained managers were said to have in the United
States, just the kind of things that the arsenal of agency-cost-reducing tools
is designed to handle. And the tools that make managers tolerably loyal to
shareholders in the United States￿transparent accounting, incentive
compensation, hostile takeover, and strong shareholder primacy
norms￿are denigrated in the strong social democracies.  Social policies
there may raise the well-being of most people, but they would do so
without much ownership separation in large firms.
In contrast, a more conservative nation typically wouldn’t drive a
wedge between shareholders on the one side, and employees and managers
on the other side.  It would facilitate, or at least allow, shareholders and
managers to ally themselves.  When they are loosely allied, ownership and
control can separate. In technical terms, managerial agency costs if
unremittingly high can induce concentration to persist, rendering corporate
law quality secondary.
In societies of the first type, concentrated shareholding is capital’s
next best means to control managers, and it persisted even after the other
economic conditions for separation were met.  Moreover, it has persisted
even in such nations that have good quality corporate law.  It budged in
recent years only as these nations’ social democratic political parties
shifted rightward.
                                                            
60. Thus the United States has today a skewed distribution of wealth and
income, but it has a very high demand of large-scale firms.  In the nineteenth century
the distribution was flatter, and, with the railroads creating a single huge market, the
demand for large firms with widely gathered capital was even higher.  If technology
flattens and shrinks firms, making them more “pocket-sized” then wealthy people can
control them more easily than if the optimal scale is very large.44 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
3. Social preconditions.  Some societies are so in turmoil that private
institutions cannot be built. Reputations are not worth developing, because
no one is sure to be able to use the reputation once built.  Private-ordering
via, say, a stock exchange won’t work, because investors lack confidence
in the exchange and fear who might capture it. But once a society has
sufficient regularity so that reputations, private institutions, and, if need be,
corporate law can be built, then if political and economic conditions are
otherwise ripe, large enterprises can arise and ownership can separate from
control. If there’s sufficient social and political regularity, corporate law
or substitutes can arise to do the job.
D. Data on Explanations Beyond Law
We have seen agency-cost- based theoretical limits to the legal theory.
 Can we measure these limits, however crudely?  If we can find a proxy
that measures one of these other conditions, then we could see whether the
two explain the degree of separation equally well, or whether adding the
political variable substantially strengthens the explanatory power of the
tests.
Two institutions affect managerial agency costs and vary from nation-
to-nation.  One is conventional, one not.  Competitive product markets are
conventionally said to reduce managerial agency costs.  And, less
conventionally, politics affects managerial agency costs, in that strongly
social democratic nations historically pressed managers to side with
employees when managers made operating decisions that would either
favor employees or shareholders but couldn’t favor both.  (The idea here
is not that, say, business schools and leadership skills in these countries are
weak—although perhaps schools there do not strongly inculcate
shareholder primacy—but that managers in such countries are pressed to
run the firm other than purely in shareholder interests.  Hence, AM, broadly
interpreted, is higher in nations where such political pressures are higher.)
 The quality of corporate law helps to predict the degree of ownership
separation, as Table 3 shows.  But the other social and political
variables—measures of the political pressure on managers—also predict
separation well, or better.  When we add political variables to the
corporate-law-driven “model,” we get much stronger predictive power
than we do with law alone. Law alone doesn’t do as well as law and
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The “F-test” measures whether a factor significantly adds power in
explaining the results.  Take the legal theory:  a qualitative index of
corporate law quality, one used frequently now in the finance literature,
predicts ownership separation plausibly. (The voting premium data
described on p. 34, however, doesn’t predict separation as nicely as an
index of corporate law rule; see Table 5, suggesting that the common index
might be imperfect.  But let’s stay with the standard index.)  Using several
measures of ownership separation and stock market strength (large firms,
medium firms, 10% as the blockholder cut-off, 20% as the cut-off), we see
in line 1 of Table 6 that the commonly-used qualitative corporate law index
predicts the depth of separation, with several results statistically
significant.
But when we add political variables, we get a significantly higher
explanatory power than with law alone, as the next two lines of Table 5
show, than the legal test alone.  A plausible correlation becomes much
stronger, and the F-statistics (shown via asterisks) reveal that half of the
results of added explanatory power from politics are quite significant
statistically.  Even if law is important, politics is independently quite
important too.
Roughly this suggests that controlling insider thievery—the type of
costs of public firms that law can reach—gets us half-way to making
public firms viable.  But if the political environment impedes managerial-
shareholder alliances, the second type of managerial agency costs would
rise, and ownership could not easily separate from control.
 *   *   *
Table 6 correlates a set of political, ownership, legal, and competitive
variables.  All three political variables predict ownership separation and
of the depth of a nation’s securities market.  The two legal variables also
predict separation and stock market depth, as does the measure of
monopoly strength.46 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
Table 5.  Correlation matrix
Political indicators Legal indicators
Competitive
indicator
Dispersion and
strength of stock
market indicators
Political
place
Employ-
ment pro-
tection
Gini
La Porta
Law
Voting
premium
Monopoly
mark-up
Stock/ mkt
cap/GDP
Widely-
held at
20% 
Political place 1.00
Employment protection -0.41 1.00
Gini after-tax 0.49  -0.53 1.00
La Porta Law 0.39 -0.95 0.65   1.00
Voting premium -0.26 0.50 0.28 -0.39   1.00
Monopoly mark-up -0.57* 0.35 -0.42 -0.41 0.39    1.00
Stock mkt.
capitalization/GDP 0.55* -0.56* 0.64* 0.70* -0.23 -0.80** 1.00
Widely-held at 20% for
Medium Firms 0.67* 0.84** 0.67* 0.87** -0.46* -0.57* 0.73 1.00
* Significant at .05 level.
** Significant at .01 level.  (Not all significant correlations are highlighted.)
Sources for data:  Political place comes from Cusack (1997); employment protection from OECD
(1994); GINI from Deininger & Squire (1996); La Porta law and widely-held at 20% from La
Porta (1999); voting premium from Nenova (2000); monopoly markup from Martins, Scarpetta
& Pilat (1996); and stock-market capitalization from OECD (1998). 
The correlation matrix shows politics persistently correlating with
dispersion:  the more conservative the nation, the more dispersed is
ownership. The matrix also shows the good quality corporate law
correlates with dispersion:  the higher the quality of corporate law, the
more dispersed is ownership. 
Sorting out which factor is the base-line cause is hard.  But analysis
can illuminate some issues.  We might want to know if the two potential
causal institutions—corporate law quality and politics—are co-linear:  Is
corporate law good everywhere that politics is conservative or middle-of-
the-road?  And do left nations uniformly have weak corporate law
protections for minority shareholders?  As it turns out, adding political
measures to the legal explanation strongly increases explanatory power.CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 47
Table 6 first correlates an index of corporate law quality with
ownership separation, showing that it explains much separation.  But 
explanatory power jumps dramatically when we add political measures..
Table 6.  F-test: Law & politics
20%
Large
20%
Medium
10%
Large
10%
Medium
Stock mkt.
Cap/GDP
La Porta Law Adj. R-Squared .38 .43 .35 .12 .11
La Porta + Political Place 
Adj. R-Squared .65*** .64*** .62*** .28*     .40***
La Porta + Gini Adj.
R-Squared .73*** .57** .79*** .38** .43***
* Significant at.05 level (i.e., adding politics significantly adds to law in explaining
         separation).
** Significant at .01 level.
*** Significant at the .001 level.
Conclusion: The Quality of Corporate Law and its Limits
I have here neither denied the value of strong corporate law that
protects distant stockholders, nor denigrated its usefulness in building
efficacious business enterprises, nor sought to refute its academic utility in
explaining some key aspects of corporate differences around the world. It
is valuable in protecting distant shareholders, as it is often the lowest costs
means to protect them.  It is useful in thereby building big firms.  If it
doesn’t exist, the society needs substitute institutions.  And it is helpful in
explaining corporate structures in the world’s developing and transition
economies, many of which cannot establish good corporate rules of the
game.
I have instead sought to map out the limits to the quality-of-corporate-
law argument.  High quality corporate law is insufficient to induce
ownership to separate from control in the world’s richest, most
economically-advanced nations. Technologically-advanced nations in the
wealthy West can have the potential for fine corporate law in theory, and
several have it in practice, but ownership will not separate from control if
managerial agency costs are high.  And managerial agency costs, unlike
insider self-dealing, are not closely connected with corporate law.  Indeed
corporate law’s business judgment rule has corporate law avoid dealing
with managerial agency costs.48 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
Today’s reigning academic theory leaves too many unanswered
questions.  Why doesn’t strong, pro-minority shareholder corporate law
lead to more blockholders, not fewer, because distant minority
stockholders would have less to fear of controllers’ trampling as law
improved?  Why do some rich nations lack even a single anecdote of over-
reaching behavior from controllers’ nevertheless lack strong separation?
 Why are there so many rich nations with, by measurement and anecdote,
low private benefits of control, high quality corporate institutions, and
much minority stock, yet without ownership separation?
The quality of conventional corporate law does not fully explain why
and when ownership concentration persists, because corporate law does
not even try to directly control managerial agency costs from dissipating
a firm’s value.  The American business judgment rule keeps courts and
law out of basic business decisions and that is where managers can lose,
or make, the really big money for shareholders.  Non-legal institutions
control these costs.   In nations where those other institutions, such as
product competition or incentive compensation, fail or do less well,
managerial dissipation would be higher and ownership cannot as easily
separate from control as it can where dissipation is lower.  Corporate law
quality can be high, private benefits of control low, but if managerial
agency costs from dissipation are high, separation will not proceed.  Even
if we believed law to be critical to building these other institutions, the
analysis would persist because different laws support the agency cost
controlling institutions (antitrust and product market competition; tax law
and incentive compensation, etc.).  A nation doesn’t control insider
machinations and motivate managers equally well; and to the extent it does
one better than the other, concentration and diffusion are affected:  The
diffusion decision is based on the sum of private benefits of control and
managerial agency costs.  Even if traditional corporate law drives private
benefits to zero, concentration should persist if managerial agency costs are
high.
Data is consistent.  Several nations have, by measurement, good
corporate law, but not much diffusion and hardly any separation.  These
nations also have a high potential for managerial agency costs:  relatively
weaker product market competition and relatively stronger political
pressures on managers to disfavor shareholdersCORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 49
The quality of a nation’s corporate law cannot be the only explanation
for why diffuse Berle-Means firms grow and dominate. Perhaps, for some
countries at some times, it’s not even the principal one.50 CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS
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